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Lesbians and gay men in Minnesota, inspired by the gay
rights movement, have increased the visibility of their political
and social activities. Enhanced visibility of lesbians and gays
has occasioned a growth in social tolerance of homosexuality,
as well as organized vocal opposition from conservative sectors.
Minnesota lawmakers have codified resulting ambivalence to-
ward lesbians and gays in state and local law and in enforce-
ment practices. Minnesota's sodomy statute serves to
legitimate and enforce homophobia and discrimination against
lesbians and gay men because people assume that the statute
censors only homosexual acts1 and that its enforcement tends
to discourage same-sex orientation. The statute, however, ren-
ders many sexual acts illegal. Furthermore, sodomy laws are
seldom actually used to prosecute consensual homosexual
behavior.
In contrast to this public discrimination, some Min-
nesotans have sought and gained limited public approval and
legal protection for lesbians and gay men under city ordi-
nances.2 Minneapolis' civil rights ordinance,3 for example, pro-
hibits discrimination based on "affectional preference" in
employment and housing. Yet Minneapolis' lesbians and gay
men seldom file claims under the ordinance for fear of further
discrimination after the legal proceedings have brought them
"out of the closet."4
* Sandra J. Grove is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota.
1. In fact, Webster's Dictionary defines "sodomy" primarily as "copulation
with a member of the same sex or with an animal." Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary 1096 (Woolf ed. 1981).
2. See, e.g., St. Paul, Minn. Legislative Code, ch. 74.01 (July, 1974) (re-
pealed April 28, 1978). See also infra note 3; St. Paul Citizens for Human Rights
v. City Council, 289 N.W.2d 402 (Minn. 1979).
3. Minneapolis, Minn. Code, Title 7, ch. 138, § 139.10 (1976).
4. Speech by Rick Osborne, Minneapolis Civil Rights Commissioner, Con-
ference on Gay and Lesbian Rights, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (April 17, 1984).
Law and Inequality
Minnesota's sodomy statute has ramifications more seri-
ous than legal or social ambivalence. The statute violates con-
stitutional rights of lesbians and gay men and should therefore
be invalidated.
In a marked trend away from universal condemnation of
homosexuality, twenty-two states have decriminalized consen-
sual sodomy5 by either legislative action or judicial determina-
tion. Minnesota's sodomy statute (section 609.293) typifies the
thirty state sodomy statutes that remain in force in the United
States today.8 The statute prohibits "voluntarily engag[ing] in
or submit[ting] to" acts of "sodomy," which subdivision one de-
fines as "carnally know[ing] any person by the anus or by or
with the mouth."7
The sodomy statute and Minnesota's enforcement of it em-
body the dominant social definitions of sexuality and gender
roles. In particular, the legal attitude toward consensual sod-
omy embodies social conceptions of the role of "consent" in de-
lineating acceptable and non-acceptable sexual behavior for
each gender. Elimination of state sodomy statutes may eventu-
ally broaden the social definition of acceptable sexual behavior
for each gender. Until then, constitutional arguments concern-
ing sodomy laws may continue to originate in and strengthen
5. States that have decriminalized private, consensual, adult homosexual
acts are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming.6. Statutes prohibiting private, consensual, adult homosexual acts are:
Ala. Code § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1978); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1411, 13-1412
(Supp. 1977); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813 (1977); D.C. Code Encycl. § 22-3502 (West
1973); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 800.02 (West 1967); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1977); Idaho
Code § 18-6605 (Supp. 1978); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3505 (1974 & Supp. 1983); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 510.100 (1975); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89, 14:89.1 (West Supp. 1977);
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §§ 553, 554 (Supp. 1977); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 272, §§ 34,
35 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158, 750.338, 750.338a
(1968); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1982); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 566.090 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Mont. Code Ann. § 94-4118 (1975); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 201.190 (1977); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1969). Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 21,
§ 886 (West 1951); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3124 (Purdon 1973); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-10-4 (1969); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-2-612 (1975); Tex. Penal Code Ann., § 21-06 (Vernon 1974); Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-403 (Supp. 1977); Va. Code § 18.2.361 (Supp. 1978); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 944.17
(West Supp. 1978).
7. Minn. Stat. § 609.293, subdivision five reads: "Consensual acts. Who-
ever, in cases not coming within the provisions of section 609.342 or 609.344
[criminal sexual conduct statutes], voluntarily engages in or submits to an act
of sodomy with another may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than




stereotypical and male-oriented gender conceptions. These
conceptions help create and maintain ambivalent attitudes to-
ward gay men and discriminatory actions against all women.8
Challengers of section 609.293 must avoid the perpetuation of
sexism in their constitutional arguments.
In this analysis, I begin with an overview of prosecutorial
practice under section 609.293, using the recent trial of Judge
Robert Crane Winton as an example. I then question the so-
cial/sexual function of all sodomy statutes in male-dominated
society. Next, I review various constitutional challenges to sec-
tion 609.293. Finally, I conclude that although section 609.293 is
unconstitutional on several grounds, lesbian and gay challeng-
ers of the statute's constitutionality may best combat sexism
and homophobia by using first amendment and cruel and unu-
sual punishment arguments rather than those based on privacy
doctrine.
A. The Recent Trial of Judge Robert Crane Winton, Jr.
Until 1984, the Minnesota sodomy statute had never been
challenged on constitutional grounds.9 But the 1982 trial of Dis-
trict Court Judge Robert Crane Winton, Jr. raised doubts about
the law and its constitutionality. Although Winton's homosex-
ual acts violated the sodomy statute, the State of Minnesota
prosecuted and convicted him only under its prostitution
statutes.10
After male youths claimed that Winton had hired them to
engage in sex with him, including oral sodomy," Winton was
8. See infra notes 46-65 and accompanying text.
9. The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union raised the issue of section 609.293's
constitutionality before the Minnesota Supreme Court in its amicus curiae
brief for In the Matter of the Honorable Robert Crane Winton, Jr., S. Ct. File No.
C8-83-150.
10. Minnesota v. Winton, Nos. 80369-1, 80370-1 and 80371-1 CO. (Minn. Dist.
Ct. June 21, 1983).
11. In February of 1982, a series of television exposes was broadcast by
WCCO-TV of Minneapolis. See Channel 4 News, WCCO-TV, I-Team series on
the sexual abuse of children, Feb. 12, 1982, by Donald Shelby. WCCO's Donald
Shelby introduced the segment about Winton by alleging that Winton sexually
abused minors while using his judicial position to condemn other child abus-
ers. The young men, whose proffles were shown in silhouette, described being
solicited by Winton as they looked for male customers in Loring Park, a well-
known center of male prostitution in Minneapolis. They described in detail be-
ing driven to Winton's home, talking with him, and allowing him to perform fel-
latio upon them, all for a fee ($40 in one instance).
A special prosecutor was appointed to investigate the matter. Testimony
from Winton's subsequent trial revealed that the television station had become
aware of the young men's allegations through contacts with the police depart-
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indicted on three charges:12 two gross misdemeanors for prosti-
tution and one felony charge for prostitution with minors1 3
Winton pleaded guilty14 in exchange for a dismissal of the more
serious counts. Before sentencing, Winton submitted a short
statement to the court discussing his sexual orientation toward
members of his own sex. He was convicted of two misdemean-
ors and fined $300.15 This reduced sentence was quite lenient
in comparison with sentences recommended for either prostitu-
tion with a minor or sodomy.
Judicial disciplinary actions against Winton followed the
close of the criminal proceedings. In a hearing before the Min-
nesota Board of Judicial Responsibility6 Winton again com-
mented on his homosexuality. Board members asked him if he
would continue to violate the state's sodomy statute. Winton
replied, "I don't know," but added that within a suitable rela-
tionship, "I'd probably do so."17 Despite these discussions, the
ment. Some months earlier, a male prostitute had implicated Winton when
asked by an officer to name any well-known customers. This information was
passed along to Shelby, who then contacted the young man personally and per-
suaded him to appear on television. See Minnesota v. Winton, Nos. 80369-1,
80370-1 and 80371-1 CO. (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 21, 1983).
12. A major city newspaper responded to Winton's indictment by praising
his personal integrity and his ability as a judge. Winton's own attorneys pub-
licly maintained that the allegations were "total fabrications." See Minneapolis
Star & Tribune, Feb. 11, 1982, at 1A, 5A, col. 1. Print media support was echoed
by parts of the legal community. The Minnesota State Bar Association's execu-
tive committee issued an official statement on February 23, 1982, criticizing
WCCO and insisting upon a "presumption of innocence" for Winton. See Min-
neapolis Star & Tribune, Feb. 24, 1982, at 7A, col 4. Fellow district court judge
Harold Kalina openly supported Winton's retention on the bench, as did the
editors of the Star & Tribune. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune, June 22, 1982, at
1A, col. 1 and 9A, col. 3.
13. Winton was indicted on two charges of prostitution which is a gross mis-
demeanor and a third charge of engaging in prostitution with a minor which is
a felony. He was not charged under the sodomy law. Pending trial, Winton
was suspended with pay from adjudicating new cases.
14. Winton originally pleaded not guilty and, in a motion to dismiss, argued
that the state's excessive entanglement with the news media rendered evi-
dence connected with the male prostitutes interviewed on television in-
admissable. The court denied the motion to dismiss. See Winton, Nos. 80369-1,
80370-1, and 80371-1.
15. $150 for each count, plus an added $30 surcharge.
16. The Board met between May 10 and 17, 1982. During the hearing Winton
faced politicians and religious leaders calling for his dismissal. On October 3,
1983, the three-judge panel which had reviewed Winton's actions and his per-
formance on the bench, recommended Winton's removal from his position as
Hennepin County District Court Judge. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Oct. 4,
1983, at IA, col. 6.
17. More specifically, Winton said, "I suppose that if I met a suitable per-
son, or one I deem to be suitable, who wants to have a relationship with me
that would involve sexual acts of that nature, I would probably do so. It would
be done in private. It would be done behind closed doors and in a way that
[Vol. 2:521
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board denied that Winton's homosexuality was at issue. The
board recommended that Winton be dismissed, citing as the
sole basis for their decision "Winton's own admissions and
other evidence of statutory violations, including prostitution
[and] sodomy."18 On May 25, 1984, the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota removed Winton from his position as district court
judge.19 The court claimed that its decision was not based on
Winton's violations of the sodomy statute.20 Removal is a harsh
and drastic penalty.
Winton's case has generated discussion and controversy
concerning the propriety and application of section 609.293, its
constitutionality, and its relation to the social status of gays
and lesbians in Minnesota. It has also raised the issue of un-
derlying political reasons for the legal system's seemingly con-
tradictory treatment of Winton. His criminal sentence was
nominal while the professional censure was exceedingly harsh.
A close look at the use of the statute by Minnesota law enforce-
ment agencies suggests that Winton's actions, homosexual in
fact but in many ways typical of heterosexual behavior, trig-
gered ambivalent legal responses historically consistent with
both his superior social status as a male and his inferior social
status as gay. Winton was protected from large fines and incar-
ceration because he is a man and, as such, empowered as a
sexual actor. He was professionally ostracized because he is
gay and, as such, a threat to the heterosexual majority. A con-
stitutional inquiry regarding sodomy law must take into ac-
count the interplay of sexism and heterosexism, their different
effects on gay men, lesbians, and all women, and their common
origin in male supremacy. Only careful consideration of lesbi-
ans' and gay men's complex political situation will assure fair
adjudication of sodomy statutes' questionable constitutionality.
B. Enforcement Policies of Section 609.293
Lesbians, gay men and heterosexuals alike almost univer-
sally disobey Minnesota's sodomy statute. Although no records
exist on the actual number of prosecutions under section
609.293, some Minnesota attorneys believe that the sodomy law
would not in any way, shape, manner or form bring discredit on the bench."
See Minneapolis Star & Tribune, May 11, 1983, at IA, 6A, col 1. See also Minne-
apolis Star & Tribune May 12, 1983, at 1A, col 4.
18. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Oct. 4, 1983, at 1A, col. 6 (emphasis added).
19. In re Kirby, 350 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1984); Minneapolis Star & Tribune,
May 25, 1984, at 1A, col. 1.
20. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, May 25, 1984, at 1A, col 3.
1984]
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"generally [is) not vigorously prosecuted."21 In fact, the statute
has a history of bifurcated enforcement. Minnesota law en-
forcement agencies have prosecuted homosexual and hetero-
sexual sodomy differently.
Ironically, while many view Minnesota's sodomy statute as
a long standing legislative disapproval of homosexuality, histor-
ically the majority of prosecutions under section 609.293 and its
predecessors have been of adult male defendants charged with
the rape of women and the sexual abuse of children. In other
words, cases in which sodomous behavior has been prosecuted
have been typically heterosexual. 22 This type of behavior con-
tinues to be prosecuted under other criminal sexual conduct
statutes.23 Currently, the Hennepin County attorney's office
rarely prosecutes anyone under the sodomy law.24 The county
maintains a policy of nonenforcement of section 609.293, mak-
ing exceptions only in cases in which defendants perform sod-
omy in public or semi-public places. County records show only
six convictions of sodomy since 1981. The six convictions in-
volved three pairs of adult male co-defendants. Law enforce-
ment officers apprehended each pair engaging in consensual
homosexual sodomy in the restrooms of commercial establish-
ments. Numerous complaints precipitated all three investiga-
tions. Since 1981 there have been no convictions involving
consensual heterosexual sodomy.
The county attorney's office attributes the small number of
convictions to its policy of nonenforcement and to its frequent
use of less stringent statutes in most sodomy cases. Gay par-
ticipants are usually charged with disorderly conduct or "lewd
and lascivious behavior."2 5 Adult instigators of sodomy with
minors may be charged under the criminal sexual conduct stat-
utes.26 The county no longer invokes section 609.293 except in
cases of public consensual sodomy.
21. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Oct. 4, 1983, at 1A, coL 6.
22. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 144.
24. Assistant to the County Attorney, Interview with Robert Lynn, Sexual
Assault Division, Hennepin County Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, Minn.
(March 26, 1984).
25. See Minn. Stat. § 609.72 (1982). See also Minn. Stat. § 617.23 (1982) (inde-
cent exposure) and Minn. Stat. § 617.23 (1982). "Lewd and lascivious behavior"
is an aspect of "indecent exposure" under Minnesota law. Although "lewd and
lascivious behavior" is a much less serious crime than sodomy, the numerous
charges under that statute have been devastating to gay men in Minneapolis,
some of whom have chosen to commit suicide when faced with exposure of
their homosexual acts. Osborne, supra note 4.
26. See infra note 144.
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C. Study of Minnesota Case Law
Study of Minnesota case law concerning sodomous con-
duct suggests that the criminal law views men, not women, as
culpable actors in sodomy and punishes men when they com-
mit sodomy too violently, with children, or with other men. The
study indicated that of fifty cases appealed 27 all involved male
defendants. 28 Only two defendants appeared not to be adults.
29
Forty-five opinions included some facts relevant to discrimina-
tory enforcement of section 609.293 or other relevant statutes.
Seven opinions did not mention the age or sex of the person
upon whom sodomy was committed by the defendant. 30 Of the
remaining thirty-eight, eight described the target of the behav-
ior as a woman,3 1 and twenty-one involved children of either
27. This case study involved only sodomy cases in which defendants ap-
pealed their convictions. These cases do not necessarily typify all sodomy
cases. Most cases in the study, however, reflect the county's policy of nonen-
forcement except under special circumstances.
28. In practice, lesbians, unlike gay men, have always been exempt from ac-
tual prosecution under section 609.293, even though they are frequently per-
ceived as engaging in illegal sexual conduct. Lesbians are clearly affected by
the statute's function as the embodiment of anti-homosexual and homophobic
sentiment. One Minneapolis lesbian who requested anonymity remarked,
You don't know exactly what they could get you for, but you know
to stay out of trouble and keep away from the police; if you get
mixed up with the law it's bound to come out that you're a lesbian
and they can use that against you.
More than that, though, it's just humiliating to realize that your pri-
vate life is of such interest to total strangers that they want to in-
terfere in it. It's as if they're saying, 'we know you're sick-you're
queer-and we think it's disgusting. We may not be able to stop
you, but we want you to know that you're disgusting.'
29. In State ex rel Polk v. Tahash, 290 Minn. 493, 493-94, 186 N.W.2d 175, 175-
76 (1971), the defendant was either 19 or 20 years old. In Minnesota v. Profit,
323 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Minn. 1982), the defendant was 18 years old.
30. The five cases without relevant facts in the opinions were: Minnesota v.
CA, 304 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1981); State ex rel Polk v. Tahash, 290 Minn. 493, 186
N.W.2d 175 (1971); State ex tel Sandeen v. Lund, 278 Minn. 433, 153 N.W.2d 894
(1967); Washburn v. Utecht, 236 Minn. 31, 51 N.W,2d 657 (1952); and State ex rel
Gagnon v. Utecht, 227 Minn. 589, 34 N.W.2d 721 (1948).
The seven cases in which the age or sex of the victim was not mentioned
but which provided some facts concerning the nature and/or manner of the
crime were: Ani v. Minnesota, 288 N.W.2d 719, 720 (Minn. 1980); Minnesota v.
Corarito, 268 N.W.2d 79, 79-80 (Minn. 1978); Minnesota ex tel Crosby v. Wood,
265 N.W.2d 638, 638 (Minn. 1978); Minnesota v. Ani, 257 N.W.2d 699, 699 (Minn.
1977); Minnesota v. Coleman, 311 Minn. 514, 514-15, 247 N.W-2d 56, 56-57 (1976);
State v. Teliock, 273 Minn. 512, 514, 142 N.W.2d 64, 66 (1966).
31. The eight cases concerning women victims were: Peterson v. Minne-
sota, 282 N.W.2d 878, 879 (Minn. 1979); Minnesota v. Carignan, 271 N.W.2d 442,
444 (Minn. 1978); Minnesota v. Vance, 254 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Minn. 1977); Minne-
sota v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 514, 253 N.W.2d 378, 380 (1977) (the victim was 17
years old); State v. Riley, 303 Minn. 251, 251, 226 N.W.2d 907, 908 (1975); State v.
Comparetto, 292 Minn. 425, 425, 193 N.W.2d 626, 627 (1971); State v. Taylor, 290
1984]
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sex32 (approximately half were girls). Three cases indicated
the victim was female without describing her age, while one
case involved a male of undesignated age.33
Only five "victims" were adult males. One man was
eighty-four years old.34 Two others were homosexually as-
saulted while in state custody.35 The remaining two cases both
involved consensual sodomy between adult males in depart-
ment store bathroom stalls.38
Thirty-four opinions described the use of force through vi-
olence and threats, or the abuse of children. The women vic-
tims of sodomy were subjected to brutal violence. Of the seven
non-consensual sodomy cases37 involving women victims, de-
Minn. 515, 515, 187 N.W.2d 129, 130 (1971); State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 79, 139
N.W.2d 800, 802 (1966). The opinions did not state whether any of the victims
were lesbians.
32. LaQuier v. Minnesota, 333 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1983) (victim was a
"child"); Minnesota v. Profit, 323 N.W.2d 34 (Minn. 1982) (victim was a 15 year
old girl); Laube v. Minnesota, 322 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1982) (victims were "three
boys, ages 13 and 14"; the defendant had also murdered a "young girl"); Minne-
sota v. Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 1979) (victim was a 16 year old male);
State v. Koonsman, 281 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 1979) (victim was one of two "broth-
ers, ages 7 and 13"); Young v. Minnesota, 281 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1979) (victims
were three girls, ages 9, 10, and 11); Minnesota v. Carignan, 272 N.W.2d 748
(Minn. 1978) (victim was a "child"); Korman v. Minnesota, 262 N.W.2d 161
(Minn. 1977) (victim was a "child"); State v. Shotley, 305 Minn. 384, 386, 233
N.W.2d 755, 757 (1975) (victim was a "boy"); State v. Chapman, 297 Minn. 508,
509, 210 N.W.2d 234, 235 (1973) (victim was a 14 year old girl); State v. Gengler,
294 Minn. 503, 504, 200 N.W.2d 187, 188 (1972) (victim was a 14 year old child);
State v. Otten, 292 Minn. 493, 195 N.W.2d 590 (1972) (victim was a 14 year old
girl); State ex rel Radke v. Tahash, 283 Minn. 146, 147, 166 N.W.2d 710, 711 (1969)
(victim was a 7 1/2 year old child); State v. Pooley, 278 Minn. 67, 68, 153 N.W.2d
143, 144 (1967) (victim was defendant's 14 year old stepson); State v. Kobi, 277
Minn. 46, 47, 151 N.W.2d 404, 405 (1967) (victims were a 6 year old boy and possi-
bly a 10 year old girl); State ex rel Edberg v. Tahash, 274 Minn. 334, 336, 143
N.W.2d 825, 826 (1966) (victim was a "boy"); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 489,
139 N.W.2d 167, 168 (1965) (victim was defendant's 11 year old stepdaughter);
State v. Anderson, 270 Minn. 411, 414, 134 N.W.2d 12, 14 (1965) (victim was a
male, age 8); State v. Hopfe, 249 Minn. 464, 465-66, 82 N.W.2d 681, 682-83 (1957)
(victim was a 15 year old boy prostitute); State v. Jones, 234 Minn. 438, 439, 48
N.W.2d 662, 663 (1951) (victim was a 15 year old boy); State v. Quinnild, 231
Minn. 99, 100, 42 N.W.2d 409, 410 (1950) (victim was a 13 year old boy).
33. Minnesota v. Gilbert, 262 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Minn. 1977); Swanson v. State,
284 Minn. 66, 68, 169 N.W.2d 32, 34 (1969); State ex rel Baker v. Utecht, 221 Minn.
145, 147, 21 N.W.2d 328, 330 (1946).
34. State v. Marks, 295 Minn. 530, 203 N.W.2d 344 (1972) (defendant was con-
victed under subdivision 2 of the 1967 statute: aggravated sodomy, which in-
cludes force, threats, or the incapacity of the victim).
35. Minnesota v. Hyatt, 281 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 1979); State v. Presley, 300
Minn. 556, 557, 220 N.W.2d 486, 487 (1974).
36. Minnesota v. Willadson, 268 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. 1978); State v. Bryant, 287
Minn. 205, 206, 177 N.W.2d 800, 801 (1970).




fendants kidnapped one victim, kidnapped and pimped an-
other,3 8 attacked two victims after intruding into their homes,
3 9
attacked one woman after she accepted a ride,40 physically
abused one woman and threatened her life,41 and attempted to
murder another victim.4 2
The affirmance rate in sodomy cases appeared high except
in cases of consensual homosexual sodomy between adult male
peers. As Winton's case suggests, reversal of these cases may
be the resu!t of social ambivalence toward gay men. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court affirmed thirty-eight of forty-five convic-
tions.4 3 It reversed and remanded or granted a new trial for six
convictions, of which one involved consensual homosexual sod-
omy, one -,volved homosexual teenage prostitution, and one
may have. .ivolved consensual heterosexual sodomy." The




Historical information from sodomy cases and modern sta-
tistics from the county attorney's office expose four significant
trends in the enforcement of section 609.293. First, the statute
regulates the conduct of men. Second, the conduct regulated
is, for the most part, rape of women and children. Third, when
the statute regulates consensual sodomy, the sexual acts are al-
most exclusively between two gay men. And fourth, courts will
reverse convictions of consensual sodomy between peers more
often than similar convictions of men engaging in sodomy with
their" social inferiors.
38. Hill, 312 Minn. at 515-16, 253 N.W.2d at 380-81; Taylor, 290 Minn. at 515-16,
187 N.W.2d at 130.
39. Comparetto, 292 Minn. at 425, 193 N.W,2d at 627; Riley, 303 Minn. at 251,
226 N.W.2d at 908.
40. Vance, 254 N.W.2d at 356.
41. Peterson, 282 N.W.2d at 879.
42. Carignan, 271 N.W.2d at 443.
43. These affirmances include those affirmed but reduced in sentence or re-
versed on other charges.
44. Willadson, 268 N.W.2d at 546-47 (consensual sodomy); Spreigl, 272 Minn.
at 497, 139 N.W.2d at 173; Schmit, 273 Minn. at 90, 139 N.W.2d at 809; Hopfe, 249
Minn. at 466-68, 475, 82 N.W.2d at 682-84, 688 (boy prostitution); Jones, 234 Minn.
at 443, 48 N.W.2d at 665; Quinnild, 231 Minn. at 108, 42 N.W.2d at 414 (one de-
fendant was aquitted of sodomy but convicted on charges of assault arising out
of the incident). Presley, 330 Minn. at 556-57, 220 N.W.2d at 487.




11. Section 609.293's Social Function
Introduction
Sodomy statutes usually regulate activities in the private
sphere.46 To assess state regulation in the private sphere, we
must first understand the sociopolitical power structure of "pri-
vate" relations. This understanding defines the constitutional
relationship between the state and those with social power. It
also reveals the effects of both intervention and non-interven-
tion on those without social power-in this case gay men and
women as a class, particularly lesbians.
A political analysis of sodomy and sodomy law i7 Minne-
sota reveals that section 609.293 serves to punish ncn-ccnsen-
sual, typically heterosexual behavior. This does not mean that
the state is reluctant to prosecute lesbians and gays because
they are homosexual. Rather, prosecutors are more likely to
characterize sexual contact between socially powerful adult
males, as opposed to between adult males and their social in-
feriors, as consensual in the masculine sense of the word. The
power to consent, that is, to refuse, is inherent in and exclusive
to the masculine gender role. Consensual sexual contact be-
tween male peers is, in a sense, an expression of the status quo
of male power. Therefore, men engaging in such behavior are
not often punished severely or openly through the legal system.
A. Institutionalized Heterosexuality
Social values have been largely defined by heterosexual
men who have power over women and children. 47 Individual
men do not have to establish their sexual power in society. In-
stead, the heterosexual hierarchy that gives them power per-
petuates itself through custom and law. This system is
pervasive and sometimes subtle. It is both legal and extra-le-
46. See Ruth Colker, Pornography and Privacy: Toward the Development of
a Group Based Theory for Sex Based Intrusions of Privacy, I Law & Inequality
191 (1983). "Private" is often a synonym for the term "sexual." While private
life (or sexual experience) is one facet of men's total experience, one which
they define and control, private life (or sexuality) is for women the definition
by men of women's total experience. Society defines women in terms of their
sexuality and men's control over the private sphere translates into control over
women's very beings and every aspect of their lives.
47. Andrea Dworkin defines male power to include 1) the power of the self,
2) the right to physical strength, 3) power to terrorize and instill fear in women
as a class, 4) the power of naming, to define experience, 5) power of owning
women and their issue, 6) power of money or wealth, and 7) the power of sex
(which is defined by what the male does with his penis). Andrea Dworkin, Por-
nography- Men Possessing Women 1-24 (1981).
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gal.48 Male-dominated heterosexuality has become institution-
alized in society.
A pervasive system of gender roles helps to maintain insti-
tutionalized heterosexuality.49 Gender roles codify the every-
day details of male dominance and female subservience.50
Traditionally, women's gender role is to be the object of male
sexual aggression.Sl Children are also objects of male sexual
aggression because they are socially and sexually identified
with women.52 Male-initiated sexual aggression is, for the most
part, acceptable in society. But men and therefore society as a
whole find sexual contact between adult males frightening and
unacceptable because it renders men objects of male sexual ag-
gression and violence.5 3 For "male sexual aggression is the uni-
fying thematic and behavioral reality of male sexuality; it does
not distinguish homosexual men from heterosexual men or het-
erosexual men from homosexual men."M Not every instance of
heterosexual contact leaves a woman bruised and bloody.55
Still, most concepts of sex and sexuality depend upon refer-
ence to a hierarchical gender system in which adult males have
power over women and children. More specifically, power and
its exercise through dominance and submission are the es-
sence of sexiness in our society. Sex itself becomes male-ori-
ented, even when there is no male participant, because the
social reality of power is that it is inherently masculine. Ulti-
mately, "sexual expression shaped by sex roles ... allocates
power in the interest of men and to the detriment of women."5 6
Male power over women and children, even if some men do not
exercise it overtly, inheres in every sexual act between persons
48. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence in
Women: Sex and Sexuality (Catharine Stimpson and Ethel Spector Person
eds. 1980).
49. See Diana Russell, Rape in Marriage, 355-56 (1982).
50. Patricia Miller and Martha Fowikes, Social and Behavioral Construc-
tions of Female Sexuality in Women Sex and Sexuality 256, 259 (Catharine
Stimpson and Ethel Spector Person eds. 1980).
51. Id.
52. Dworkin, supra note 47, at 50.
53. "As long as male sexuality is expressed as force or violence, men as a
class will continue to enforce the taboo against male homosexuality to protect
themselves from having that force or violence directed against them." Id. at 60.
54. Id. at 57.
55. Andrea Dworkin attributes limits on male violence to the fact that
"[mIen choose their spheres of advocacy according to what they can bear and/
or what they can do well. Men will advocate some forms of violence and not
others. Some men will renounce violence in theory, and practice it in secrecy
against women and children." Id. at 52.




because it inheres in the concept of sex itself. Hence, the male-
dominated gender system and sexual practice tend to
strengthen one another through the mutual perpetuation of
male power.
B. The Role of Consent
Within the context of forced institutionalized heterosexu-
ality, "consent" is also defined only with reference to male
power over women and children. By its definition the term
functions to perpetuate male power. "Consent" by a woman or
a child is, in political terms, never on an equal footing with con-
sent by a man. Women's and children's "consent" to sexual ac-
tivity is recognized when it enhances male power. Men's
consent to sexual activity is power.
Three basic realities reveal the role of "consent" in institu-
tionalized heterosexuality. First, the contradiction between wo-
men's "consent" and the realities of rape denies women sexual
power over their own bodies. Few women are able to actually
avoid, or have the power not to consent, when men attempt
rape. Second, the social and legal conception of what consti-
tutes a woman's consent to the commission of sexual acts upon
her is so broad as to make the term almost meaningless.5 7 Spo-
ken or gestured refusal is often interpreted as consent. If a fe-
male victim of sexual attack manifests any sexuality past or
present, both the legal system and her social community are
likely to characterize her as a seducer. Third, women's relative
economic and psychological powerlessness often prevents them
from exercising any power to refuse that men may grant them.
In short, women are always presumed to consent to sexual ag-
gression being acted out upon them. This presumption arises
from the rigid female gender role of sexual submittor which de-
fines female sexuality as consent to male sexual aggression.
The presumption always reduces women's power to refuse.
Men's power to consent, in contrast, is so universal that it
is seldom even considered except in the context of homosexual
rape. Although men are sometimes the victims of rape, the per-
centage of adult male victims as compared to women and chil-
dren victims is very small.58 Homosexual rape evokes greater
57. Id. at 158. See also discussion of Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1979), rev'd, 424 A.2d 720, (Md. 1980), in Caleb Foote and Robert
Levy's textbook, Criminal Law- Cases and Materials, 609-17 (1981) for an exam-
ple of men's inability even to decide whether to allow women to refuse sexual
contact.
58. "Boys and men do experience sexual abuse at the hands of men. The
[Vol. 2:521
MINNESOTA SODOMY LAW
social outrage than heterosexual rape. This outrage both ob-
scures the identity of the victims of the vast majority of rapes
and instead focuses on men, as is the social norm. This outrage
also occurs because men are presumed not to consent to sexual
aggression being acted out upon them. This presumption
arises from the rigid male gender role of the sexual aggressor.
Exercising the presumption allows men the power to refuse by
mere inaction.
In the context of institutionalized heterosexuality, sexual
contact deemed "consensual" by its very nature will always af-
firm men's power over women because the dominant, socially
empowered or "masculine," partner's consent means more than
the submissive, socially devalued or "feminine," partner's
consent.
C. Consent and Homosexual Sodomy
When consensual activity is homosexual, it is socially con-
demned not because it undermines male power, but because it
extends that power too far, allowing it to be exercised over
other less powerful men.
Homosexual sodomy between adult male peers is, in a
sense, the ultimate exercise of male power through consent.
Truly mutual consent in society is possible only between adult
male peers.5 9 Sexual behavior of the socially powerful is very
difficult to prosecute. The socially powerful control privacy and
they usually engage in sexual behavior in private. Between
adult male peers, disclosure would operate against the sociopo-
litical as well as the penal interests of both parties. Hence, a
failure to prosecute consensual homosexual sodomy is better
viewed as the legal sanction of male sexual prerogative than as
official condonation of homosexuality per se.
As an example of the exercise of male sexual power in
"consensual" sexual contact, Judge Winton's case has come to
represent conflicting--and perhaps changing-attitudes of a
homophobe's distorting concentration on this fact, which cannot and must not
be denied, neatly eliminates from view the primary victims of male sexual
abuse: women and girls." Dworkin, supra note 47, at 56.
59. Lesbians, as women, lack the requisite social power to consent and
hence may be hindered in their sexual relations by social definitions of sex and
sexuality. As lesbians, however, they may experience sex and sexuality
outside the context of male participation and definition. See Marilyn Frye, To
Be and Be Seen: The Politics of Reality, in The Politics of Reality: Essays in
Feminist Theory 152 (1983). Absent an enforcer, male dominance no longer de-
mands consent in the traditional sense. At this point, the sexualization of dom-
inance and submission gives way to the possibility of mutuality.
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male-dominated society toward gay men who are on the one
hand very highly valued as men, and on the other, devalued as
gay. Winton has attained public power, material wealth, and
social prestige. He may be deemed to have benefited from and
upheld male privilege through these traditional aspects of insti-
tutionalized male power.60 Moreover, in light of Winton's social
and professional prestige,6' the relative youth of his sexual
partners,62 and his dominant role in the encounters,6 3 Winton's
behavior so typified the heterosexual male gender role that it is
not surprising that the Minnesota legal system treated him as if
he had engaged in heterosexual prostitution and not consen-
sual homosexual sodomy.64
Yet Winton chose to relinquish a great deal of his male
power by publicly discussing his homosexuality. At his hear-
ing, Winton spoke of -homosexual status as completely analo-
gous to heterosexual status rather than as an aberration.65 And
perhaps most significantly, Winton openly contemplated future
violation of section 609.293 in mature homosexual relationships
with his adult male peers. His unusually frank statements im-
plicitly threaten the system of institutionalized heterosexuality
60. Until the WCCO scandal, Winton was the epitome of the traditionally
powerful male. His position of district court judge is an influential one, com-
manding a comfortable guaranteed salary ($48,000 per year). He was allowed
considerable judicial discretion, and his reputation gave him a great deal of
freedom to exercise that discretion. He was used in especially difficult or con-
troversial cases because of his reputation for fairness.
61. Winton's criminal acts were in many ways a typical exercise of male
sexual prerogative. Since males typically command money while women have
traditionally relied upon them for financial support, sexual favors in return for
money, whether within marriage or in the brothels, are a traditional aspect of
institutionalized heterosexuality. Men's financial power is a significant compo-
nent of their sexual power over women, and economic force is a major expres-
sion of male sexual aggression. "[T]he exchange of sex for survival has
historically assured women's economic dependence and inferiority as well as
sexual availability to men. Women historically have been required to exchange
sexual services for material survival, in one form or another. Prostitution and
marriage. .. institutionalize this arrangement," MacKinnon, supra note 56, at
174. Winton paid his partners to engage in sodomy with him.
62. At least one of Winton's partners was a minor while Winton is in his
late fifties. The age difference aggravates the power differential between them.
63. Winton was apparently the sexual aggressor in the encounters; he per-
formed fellatio upon the other males.
64. To maintain an appearance of propriety, courts in Minnesota have been
fairly lenient concerning more common offenses committed by its judges and
attorneys and hence have avoided the publicity of disciplinary actions. Com-
mon offenses such as alcoholism and heterosexual prostitution for example, are
deemed to be "unrelated to the practice of law." See In re Kimmel, 322 N.W.2d
224 (Minn. 1982).
65. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, May 12, 1983 at 1A, col. 5: "I can put my
feelings aside just like any heterosexual judge can when he is trying a rapist."
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which protects males from masculine sexual aggression by so-
cial taboo.
The Minnesota Supreme Court is unlikely to declare sec-
tion 609.293 unconstitutional in a case involving a male so
closely identified with the judiciary and so clearly symbolizing
male power. But, as the controversy around Winton's case in-
dicated, gay men's gradual acquisition of power and social sta-
tus may bring about a reevaluation of male homosexuality
which may eventually have constitutional significance.
III. Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Law
Many state courts have considered constitutional chal-
lenges to sodomy laws. These challenges have claimed sodomy
laws 1) violate rights to privacy,66 equal protection, 6 and free-
dom of expression,68 or that they are 2) unconstitutionally
vague 69 and overbroad, 70 3) impositions of cruel and unusual
punishment,71 or 4) impermissible establishments of religion.72
Unsuccessful challengers at the state level gained a forum in
the United States Supreme Court in Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney for the City of Richmond.73 In Doe, the Court rejected
several federal constitutional objections to a Virginia sodomy
statute. In effect, the Court's decision in Doe left state courts
and legislatures free either to retain the laws or to invalidate
them under state constitutions. Doe's uncertain precedential
value has prompted some state courts to base invalidation on
federal constitutional grounds.
66. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975), aI'd mem., 425 U.S. 901, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976); People v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980), cert. denied 451
U.S. 987 (1981).
67. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 485, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949, 415 N.E.2d at 938-39; Hughes
v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 505, 287 A.2d 299, 305 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025
(1972); Stewart v. United States, 364 A.2d 1205 (D.C. 1976).
68. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200; State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 109, 547 P.2d 6,
8, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976).
69. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975); Canfield v. State, 506 P.2d 987 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991 (1973); Bateman, 113 Ariz. at
109-10, 547 P.2d at 8-9; State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 371 A.2d 596 (1977); State v.
Enslin, 25 N.C. App. 662, 214 S.E.2d 318 (1975); Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366
Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974).
70. Swikert v. Cady, 381 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 635 (7th
Cir. 1975); Wanzer v. State, 232 Ga. 523, 207 S.E.2d 466 (1974); Carter v. State, 255
Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973) cert. denied 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
71. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200; Carter, 255 Ark. at 232-33, 500 S.W.2d at 373.
72. Carter, 255 Ark. at 230-31, 500 S.W.2d at 372-73; Stewart, 364 A.2d 1208-09.
73. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affrd mem., 425 U.S. 901, reh'g denied,
425 U.S. 985 (1976).
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The U.S. Supreme Court generally defers to the judgment
of state legislatures concerning the validity of state law. Since
the Supreme Court decided United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts74 in 1938, however, it has demonstrated its willingness to
review with "strict scrutiny" state legislation which "appears
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the constitu-
tion."7 5 The Court applies this heightened standard of review,
less deferential to the states than the usual "presumption of va-
lidity" for state law, when the challenged legislation violates a
right "fundamental" to "substantive" due process under the
fourteenth amendment. Carolene Products also suggested that
statutes violating specific prohibitions of the constitution or
prompted by "prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties" might trigger strict scrutiny of the legislation.76 The
"strict scrutiny" standard requires that compelling state inter-
ests justify a state's violation of fundamental constitutional
rights or discriminatory treatment of a "suspect" group and
that no less burdensome means to the state's desired end exist.
In other words, the state must carefully tailor the statutory
means to fit the compelling end by the best means available.
77
If the right is not fundamental, or the group affected is not
"suspect," a lower standard of scrutiny applies. Under the low-
est standard of scrutiny, the Court will uphold legislation "if it
is merely rationally related to some legitimate governmental
purpose which falls within the States broad police powers." 78
Constitutional challenges to sodomy statutes have seldom
commanded strict or even intermediate scrutiny from the
courts, and therefore few have been successful. Each constitu-
tional challenge, however, has support in some case law. State
courts have most often accepted privacy and equal protection
arguments. Other arguments, perhaps because they involve
more subjective judicial determinations, have had limited suc-
cess in this politically volatile area.
A. Substantive Due Process and the Right to Privacy
Some courts have held that the constitutional right to pri-
vacy protects the right to engage in consensual sodomy.79 Such
a ruling would invalidate any state statute that significantly im-
74. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
75. Id. at 152 n.4.
76. Id.
77. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965).
78. Id.
79. See Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 485, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949, 415 N.E.2d at 938 (1980).
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pinges upon that right unless the state has a sufficiently com-
pelling reason to enact the statute. Although the Supreme
Court rejected privacy challenges to a state sodomy statute in
Doe, the Court's prior privacy cases provide a basis for ex-
tending the right of privacy to consensual sodomy. Some lower
courts, citing this line of authority, have done so.
Plaintiffs challenging Minnesota's sodomy law on privacy
grounds must assert that the prerogative to engage in consen-
sual sodomy is a fundamental right that outweighs any possible
state interest in its regulation. Bringing such a challenge will
occasion a political balancing contest. Lesbian and gay oppo-
nents of section 609.293 are disadvantaged in that contest by
two current legal trends. First, the Supreme Court has strug-
gled to limit the spectrum of available "fundamental" rights to
conservative and time-honored activities related to heterosexu-
ality, such as childrearing and marriage.80 Without new per-
sonnel or more educating advocacy, 8 1 the conservative Court
seems unlikely to see as fundamental the freedom to engage in
what has traditionally been considered deviant sex acts. And,
second, regardless of which "tier" of scrutiny is applied to the
statute, federal courts have allowed the states to assert "com-
pelling" interests such as the prevention of crime and "moral
delinquency," without requiring specific proof of any causal
connection between these interests and the regulation of
sodomy.
Heterosexual couples who practice sodomy might per-
suade the Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental right of
privacy protecting heterosexual sodomy. The Supreme Court
in Griswold v. Connecticut 2 held that the marital relationship
is "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees."8 3 The Court invalidated a state law
forbidding the use of contraceptives by married couples.
84 Jus-
tice Douglas, writing for the majority, was repulsed by govern-
mental invasion of "the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms."85 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,86 the Court extended the
80. Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Loving v. Corn-
monwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
81. See, e.g., David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's
Rights in a Man's World, 2 Law & Inequality 33 (1984).
82. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
83. Id. at 485.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Subsequently, the Supreme Court held in Stanley v.
Georgia that the right to privacy prohibits the state from making criminal
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right of married persons to use contraceptives to unmarried in-
dividuals. The Court reasoned that the equal protection clause
required even-handed treatment of married and unmarried
(heterosexual) persons as regards contraception. 87 In Roe v.
Wade,88 the Court further broadened the zone of privacy to in-
clude a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion
during the first trimester after conception.8 9
The privacy challenge to Minnesota's sodomy statute may
be attractive to lesbian and gay, as well as heterosexual, oppo-
nents of section 609.293 because it has been more seriously dis-
cussed and more readily accepted than other constitutional
challenges. A favorable privacy ruling, moreover, would oper-
ate to decriminalize consensual sodomy, both homosexual and
heterosexual.
Challengers of section 609.293 have a model privacy argu-
ment in People v. Onofre.90 In Onofre, the New York Court of
Appeals invalidated New York's sodomy statute in 1980.91
Reading the prior cases broadly, the court in Onofre extended
the Griswold line of privacy cases to support a fundamental
right to engage in both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy
in private. The court construed the privacy right first articu-
lated in Griswold and Eisenstadt as standing for a fundamental
right of privacy encompassing "the right ... to make decisions
with respect to the consequence of sexual encounters and, nec-
essarily, to have such encounters .. *"92 The New York court
also interpreted a Supreme Court pornography case as recog-
nizing the fundamental right to "seek sexual gratification by
viewing [obscene material in private]."93 Noting that the state
"mere private possession of obscene material," pornography, within one's
home. 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
87. Justice Brennan, in an often quoted paragraph of the majority opinion,
justified this extension of Griswold:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an in-
dependent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an associa-
tion of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether or not to bear or beget a
child.
Id. at 453.
88. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
89. See also Roe's progeny in Colker, supra note 46, at 207 n.64.
90. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 487, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950, 415 N.E.2d at 940.
93. Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
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had made no showing of physical harm to individuals engaging
in sodomy, the court saw no reason that "the right of privacy
... to indulge in acts of sexual intimacy by unmarried per-
sons" should not extend to protect consensual sodomy, both
homosexual and heterosexual.94 Having determined that the
sodomy statute impinged significantly upon this fundamental
right, the court applied a standard of strict scrutiny. The state
had failed to show (beyond its bald assertions) any danger to
public health or morals due to sodomous conduct. The court,
therefore, found no compelling state interest to justify the vio-
lation of privacy.
It is uncertain whether the Supreme Court would accept
such an argument. The Court has lent some approval to pro-
statutory opinions confining the Griswold precedent strictly to
their facts in its summary affirmance of Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney for Richmond. The lower court in Doe more clearly
limited Griswold to decisions concerning procreation, and re-
fused to recognize a fundamental right to privacy in choosing
any particular form of sexual gratification. It held that the ra-
tional-basis test was applicable and sodomy laws might be up-
held so long as the legislature might reasonably have believed
that criminalization of sodomy would protect public health and
morals.9 5 However, changing attitudes might prompt the
Supreme Court to follow the New York Court of Appeals' inter-
pretation of the privacy doctrine in Onofre.
The lower court in Doe, like the dissent in Onofre, re-
stricted Griswold to matters of marriage and procreation, and
held that there was "no authoritative judicial bar to the pro-
scription of homosexuality-since it is obviously no portion of
marriage, home or family life .. *"96 Doe, however, was de-
cided by a three-judge panel with one judge dissenting for the
same reasons as were later set forth in Onofre. It was affirmed
without oral argument by the Supreme Court and is therefore
of uncertain precedential value.
By ignoring Winton's violation of the sodomy statute, the
Minnesota legal system extended a de facto privacy right to
Winton's prerogative to engage in consensual homosexual sod-
94. Id. at 488, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951, 415 N.E.2d at 940.
95. Unprovable assumptions, about what is necessary to protect societal in-
terest in order and morality, suffice under the rational-basis test to show that
the law based on those assumptions is a valid exercise of the police power.
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63-64 (1973).
96. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202; Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 498, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 957, 415
N.E.2d at 946 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
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omy. Perhaps the trial court's treatment of Winton's prosecu-
tion signals a willingness to consider privacy challenges in the
future. A Minnesota Supreme Court decision to allow Winton
to remain on the bench would have amounted to a determina-
tion that homosexuality does not negatively affect the moral or
intellectual capacity of a district court judge to decide cases.
Had such a precedent been set, Minnesota's courts would have
had great difficulty upholding section 609.293's constitutional
validity on grounds that homosexual sodomy is either morally
reprehensible or dangerous to the public. Had Winton been al-
lowed to stay on the bench, due process arguments based on
the Griswold line of privacy cases would have been a great
deal more persuasive. As Onofre illustrates, the state's inabil-
ity to prove any substantial harm from consensual sodomy is
the key to a successful due process challenge. Without proof of
harm there is neither a "compelling state interest" to outweigh
intervention under strict scrutiny, nor a "rational basis" for the
statute under the lowest deferential lower tier of scrutiny.
The Griswold line, however, is a less favorable foundation
for rights of lesbians and gays, for it reinforces male-defined
and male-centered notions of "consent." The Griswold cases,
insofar as they imply a zone of privacy around sexual activity,
generally extend to those with social power the freedom to do
as they wish, without governmental interference, so long as
their activity is termed "sexual." In this way the Griswold line
benefits men as a class by reaffirming and extending their sex-
ual prerogative.
For women, the result of a policy of non-intervention into
'"private" sexual relations is exploitation97 because society de-
fines sex in terms of the exploitation of women and other social
inferiors by men. Extending the heterosexual sexual privacy
right to consensual homosexual sodomy would bolster the erro-
neous belief that "private" heterosexual relations are always
"consensual" and therefore, by definition, non-exploitative.
Strict non-interventionism through privacy doctrine glosses
over the unequal power relations which are the source of an ex-
ploitative concept of "consent."
Extending privacy rights without considering inequality in
the private sphere might produce two harms. First, the exten-
sion of a privacy right to consensual homosexual sodomy would
expose socially devalued males to a sexual status similar to




that of women. Second, this extension would add legitimacy to
men's sexual power, which by definition could subject women
to more intrusive sexual abuse within the confines of male-
dominated "consensual" sexual relations.
While intervention by a male-dominated legal system does
not guarantee equality, a judicial forum allows women and
other socially devalued individuals to challenge sexist defini-
tions of consent by seeking relief from or remedy for the impo-
sition of sexual contact by men. Use of the constitutional
concept of privacy by challengers of Minnesota's sodomy stat-
ute may perpetuate sexism. Current privacy doctrine seems to
ignore sexist gender conceptions that are a result of and have
resulted in a power differential between men and women in the
"private" sphere. The doctrine has functioned to preserve that
differential. Unfortunately, Winton's relatively lenient treat-
ment by the criminal justice system seems to reinforce rather
than challenge the institutional concept of privacy in sexual
activity.
B. Equal Protection
Lesbian and gay opponents of sodomy statutes have ar-
gued that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment forbids the disparate treatment that the statutes occasion.
A logical corollary to the privacy challenge, the equal protec-
tion argument has had limited success in that it has not served
to protect lesbians and gays as such from the effects of sodomy
laws. The anti-lesbian, anti-gay impact of the laws has survived
with approval.
The equal protection clause requires that "a [statutory]
classification [of persons] 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "98
Equal protection arguments have therefore centered on issues
of differences between various groups or classes of people and
the relation of statutory classifications to those differences.
Under the "mere rationale" test, a discriminatory statute
is upheld so long as "the classification [it draws] has relation to
the purpose for which it is made."99 The Court has described
deferential review in equal protection law- "[WJ e will not over-
98. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
99. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
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turn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different
groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any
combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude
that the legislature's actions were irrational."100
Since Carolene Products,101 discriminatory infringement
of a "fundamental" right or discrimination against a "protected
class" requires that the state justify the statute with "compel-
ling" state interests and that the discriminatory classification is
"necessary" to achieve the desired goal.10 2 In equal protection
analysis this means the difference that the classification pur-
ports to reflect must be both real and accurately described.
Despite the two-tiered theory, equal protection case law
reveals a multi-tiered or "sliding scale" approach. The nature
of the group discriminated against and the importance of the
right violated determine the level of scrutiny to be applied. Dif-
ferent levels of scrutiny require different degrees of corollation
between statutory classifications and "real" differences.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez,103 the Supreme Court set forth "the traditional indicia of
suspectness: the class is... saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian polit-
ical process."10 4 The Court has also used strict scrutiny when
the class discriminated against has "'been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly
indicative of their abilities . . ."'105, when the characteristic
upon which the classification is drawn "is an immutable char-
acteristic determined solely by an accident of birth . .."106 or
when the characteristic "frequently bears no relation to the
ability to perform or contribute to society."
107
While racial classifications are "immediately suspect" and
trigger "the most rigid scrutiny,"10 8 classifications based on sex
100. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
101. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
102. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
722-23 (1973).
103. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
104. Id. at 28.
105. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307-313 (1976)
("aged" persons did not constitute a "suspect" class).
106. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (women did not consti-
tute a "suspect" class).
107. Id.
108. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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characteristics trigger only an intermediate level of scrutiny.
"[ Cilassifications by gender must serve important governmen-
tal objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives."109 Sex discrimination is not considered
"inherently odious" as racial discrimination is because it does
not share according to the Court, the latter's "lengthy and
tragic history."110
Some federal courts have relied on Doe as authority in
holding that gays and lesbians are not a protected class for pur-
poses of the equal protection clause. 1' Some courts, however,
have applied an "intermediate" level of review to sodomy law,
recognizing that laws which infringe on homosexual preference
violate the "fundamental" right to privacy."12 Under such scru-
tiny, the court balances the individual right violated against the
importance of the governmental interest, and also considers the
degree to which the right is infringed upon and the availability
of less restrictive statutory means.113 As in privacy law, the
government is allowed to assert largely unprovable "compel-
ling" state interests that may prevail over an equal protection
challenge to a sodomy law despite the law's discriminatory in-
fringement of "fundamental" rights.
Other federal courts have distinguished Doe, finding that
lesbians and gays form a protected class because they have all
the indicia of "suspectness." A Texas court, for example, rea-
soned that most homosexuality is "not a matter of choice."
114
Applying strict scrutiny, the court found that a Texas statute
proscribing only homosexual sodomy'15 was not sufficiently re-
109. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (emphasis added).
110. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265-303 (1978).
111. Be~ler v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809 (9th Cir. 1980); DeSantis v. Pacific
T. & T. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979).
112. Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1981).
113. Id. at 1381; Childers v. Dallas Police Department, 513 F. Supp. 134 (N.D.
Tex. 1981).
114. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1143 (NJ). Tex. 1982). The court distin-
guished Doe as applying only to sodomy laws that do not discriminate between
homosexual and heterosexual sodomy and hence do not violate the equal pro-
tection clause. Id. at 1136-38.
For discussions of homosexuality as natural and chosen, see After You're
Out: Personal Experiences of Gay Men and Lesbian Women (Karla Jay & Al-
len Young eds. 1975); Sidney Abbott & Barbara Love, Sappho Was A Right-On
Woman (1978).
115. Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1150 ("Article 524 (Sodomy) was replaced with
§ 21.06 (Homosexual Conduct), which condemned only oral or anal sex be-
tween consenting adults of the same sex: 'A person commits an offense if he




lated to purported governmental interests in "morality, de-
cency, health, welfare, safety and procreation" to withstand
such scrutiny.116
In some states, like Minnesota, the equal protection chal-
lenge may be difficult to litigate because the laws, like section
609.293, seldom mention the sex of either participant in
sodomous acts.117 At least according to the literal text of many
sodomy statutes, everyone is equally punishable for sodomous
activity. Therefore, a successful equal protection challenge de-
pends upon Minnesota courts' willingness to consider disparate
enforcement of section 609.293's prohibition of consensual sod-
omy. Even if the courts reach the enforcement issue, they may
consider lesbians and gays a proper focus of limited
prosecutorial resources because lesbians and gays are pre-
sumed more likely than others to commit the proscribed acts.
If the prosecutor's decision not to charge Winton under
the state's sodomy statute and the court's disposition of his
criminal case signal a positive re-evaluation of gay men, then
the state may be unable to prove a difference between the
harm caused by consensual homosexual sodomy and that
caused by consensual heterosexual sodomy. Since only gay
men have been prosecuted in recent years the statute could be
struck down as discriminatorily enforced. The equal protection
clause would then preclude Minnesota from prosecuting and
discriminating against lesbians and gay men simply because
they are lesbians and gay men.
Onof-e was a rare example of a successful equal protec-
tion challenge extended to protect the rights of lesbians and
gays as unmarried persons. The New York sodomy statute did
not apply to married couples engaging in sodomy. Using Eisen-
stadt as authority for extending the Griswold fundamental
right to marital privacy, or sexual privacy, to the unmarried, the
court found, without refering to the sex of the partners vis-a-vis
one another, that no significant differences existed between the
consensual sodomy of married couples and consensual sodomy
of the unmarried. Hence there was no prerequisite legislative
rationale, "compelling" or not, for treating these "similarly cir-
cumstanced" classes differently. The court invalidated the stat-
ute on equal protection grounds.
116. Id. at 1124-25.
117. In Stewart v. United States, 364 A.2d 1205 (D.C. 1976), gay challengers
lost on equal protection grounds since "by its very terms [the statutel pros-
cribes specific conduct and does not single out any particular group of per.
sons." Id. at 1207.
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Unmarried lesbian and gay opponents might challenge the
Minnesota sodomy statute on equal protection grounds. Sec-
tion 609.293, however, makes no express distinction between
married and unmarried persons. Without the express statutory
distinction the argument depends on a successful privacy chal-
lenge by married persons establishing their right to engage in
sodomy. Inevitably, such a privacy challenge loses its appeal.
Like the Griswold privacy cases, this privacy argument reaf-
firms the exploitation within "private" sexual relations. 118
Failure of the equal protection clause in the area of les-
bian and gay rights may only reflect heterosexual society's in-
ability to recognize homosexuality as a status at all. Once
again, male-dominated society is unable to conceive of homo-
sexuality in the context of the heterosexual gender system.
While heterosexual gender roles are seen as fixed and immuta-
ble from birth, homosexual orientation is seen as acquired or
perhaps even actively sought out by lesbians and gays.1 19 (One
does not have to do anything to be heterosexual, but through
homosexual acts one "becomes" lesbian or gay.) Heterosexual
society reduces lesbian and gay status to a series of acts unde-
serving of the protection of the equal protection clause.
Advancement in equal protection law for lesbians and
gays seems contingent upon advancement in equal protection
law for women. If sexual relations between the sexes were less
hierarchical, homosexual relations would not threaten men's
power advantage over women.
Women as a class and gay men as a class have endured
similar oppression. Both are stereotyped as weak, impotent,
and ineffectual. Both have been condemned, legally punished
and even murdered for actively expressing their sexuality.
Both have been excluded from employment, housing, and par-
ticipation in government and social organizations because of
their status. Both have sought to "pass" as heterosexual men
to avoid discrimination. At a minimum, the Supreme Court
must consider sex discrimination "suspect." As one federal cir-
cuit court has reasoned, if sex is not considered suspect, cer-
tainly homosexuality is not suspect.1 20 Just as sex
discrimination must be suspect so too must heterosexual dis-
crimination be suspect.
118. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
119. But see supra note 114.
120. DeSantis v. Pacific T & T Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979).
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C. Void for Vagueness
The concept of "void for vagueness" is an outgrowth of the
due process clause of the fourteenth and the fifth amendments.
This constitutional doctrine prohibits the states from depriving
their citizens of liberty or property without "due process of
law." Under this doctrine the Court has invalidated statutes
written so vaguely that they fail to provide average persons
with fair notice that certain acts are illegal.12 1
Legislatures have traditionally used very general, euphe-
mistic and often archaic language in the construction of sod-
omy statutes. The Supreme Court of Alaska noted, "[t]he
subjects of 'sodomy' and 'crime against nature' are said by
many authorities to be so loathsome that they should be dis-
cussed only in language which is enigmatic to the point of de-
liberate obscurantism."122 Such legislative modesty has made
some sodomy statutes vulnerable to constitutional attack under
the fourteenth amendment. But "void for vagueness" chal-
lenges have had only limited success. Many courts have found
sodomy law's historical terminology specific enough, despite
euphemisms.
The Supreme Court in Rose v. Locke 123 held that a statute
proscribing the "crime against nature" was not unconstitution-
ally vague as applied to cunnilingus.124 The Court concluded
that the statute provided sufficient notice that the acts in ques-
tion were illegal, noting the long use of the term "crime against
nature," its frequent use at common law, and previous state
holdings defining the term to include fellatio, and "sodomy."125
As applied to fellatio, sodomy statutes prohibiting "unnatural
and lascivious acts," and "the infamous crime against nature,"
have likewise been found constitutional. 2 6
121. The rationale behind the concept of vagueness is that "no man (sic)
shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he (sic) could not rea-
sonably understand to be proscribed." United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954), quoted in Wainright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22 (1973). The doctrine rein-
forces notions of scienter on the one hand while it discourages arbitrary and
discriminatory conduct of law enforcement officers and judges on the other.
122. Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 642 (Alaska 1969).
123. 423 U.S. 48 (1975).
124. Justice Brennan, however, dissented, insisting that the common law
meaning of "crime against nature" was limited to anal intercourse and that av-
erage persons would understand the statute to prohibit only those acts. 423
U.S. at 53. The Alaska Supreme Court has held the same phrase, "crime
against nature," void for vagueness when applied to anal intercourse. Harris,
457 P.2d at 648.
125. 423 U.S. at 50.
126. State v. Levitt, 118 RL 32, 371 A.2d 596 (1977); Commonwealth v. Baltha-
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The Minnesota legislature seemed to anticipate vagueness
challenges to its sodomy statute when, in 1921, it struck out the
term "the detestable and abominable crime against nature"
from the statutory language and redefined "sodomy" as "carnal
know[ledge] of any ... person by the anus or by or with the
mouth."127 This wording, retained in today's statute, seems un-
questionably less vague than that upheld in state court cases.
Challengers of section 609.293 might take advantage of the
fact that the precise meanings of terms like "crime against na-
ture," "unnatural acts," and "sodomy" are legal issues that re-
main unresolved. American case law is conflicting and vague
as to exactly which acts constitute "sodomy" and which do not.
Section 609.293's title, "sodomy," and its use of the somewhat
antiquated term "carnal know[ledge]" make it partially vulner-
able to attack on grounds of vagueness.
Despite its occasional success, void for vagueness adjudi-
cations of sodomy laws have limited effectiveness. A legisla-
ture determined to prohibit sodomy after judicial invalidation
of its sodomy statute might easily reformulate its statute in
more precise language, as did the Minnesota legislature in 1921,
zar, 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974); Canfield v. State, 506 P.2d 987 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1973).
127. See Katheryn Katz, Sexual Morality and the Conwtitution: People v.
Onofre, 46 Albany L Rev. 311 (1982). Gen. Stat. Minn. § 10183 (1921). Sodomy
was among the enumerated crimes when Minnesota legislators enacted their
first criminal code in 1851. Minn. Rev. Stat. ch. 107 § 13 (1851). In 1873 the state
punished "sodomy, or the crime against nature, either with mankind or any
beast." Gen. Stat. Minn. ch. C § 14 (1873). In 1891 the state recast the statute to
prohibit "the detestable and abominable crime against nature" and included
necrophilia as well as bestiality in the broad scope of the law. Minn. Gen. Stat.
§ 6216 (1891). In 1921, Minnesota legislators again revised the statute into a
form that more closely resembled the modern statute. Gen. Stat. Minn. § 10183
(1921). The 1921 revision punished "any person who carnally knows in any
manner any animal or bird, or carnally knows any male or female person by
the anus or by or with the mouth ... or attempts sexual intercourse with a
dead body." The 1921 statute, unlike its predecessors, expressly included con-
sensual behavior, punishing anyone who "voluntarily submits to such carnal
knowledge."
The law remained unchanged until 1967 when the Minnesota legislature en-
acted Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1967) (original version at 1967 Minn. Laws ch. 507,
§ 4). This statute retained the definition of sodomy as carnal knowledge "by
the anus or by or with the mouth," but it no longer included necrophilia or bes-
tiality, which were redefined as the separate crime of "bestiality." ("Whoever
carnally knows a dead body or an animal or bird is guilty of bestiality which is
a misdemeanor. If knowingly done in the presence of another he may be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for not more than one year" or to a $1,000 fine or both.
Id. at § 5.)
Finally, in 1977 the legislature amended the statute to prohibit only consen-
sual sodomy. Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1982) (original version at 1977 Minn. Laws
ch. 130, § 4). See supra note 7 and infra note 144.
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so that it conforms to the minimum requirements of due
process.
D. Overbreadth
The overbreadth challenge has sometimes been successful
in decriminalizing heterosexual conduct. It is, however, a chal-
lenge particularly ill-suited for those seeking the decriminaliza-
tion of consensual homosexual sodomy. The success of an
overbreadth challenge depends upon a statute's infringement
of the rights of a "protected" class. As previously discussed,
lesbians and gays are only sometimes classified as protected
classes.l1
The Supreme Court held in NAACP v. Alabama 129 that "a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitu-
tionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms."13o Courts apply the resulting
"overbreadth" doctrine, which invalidates unnecessarily broad
regulations, in three stages. First, the challenger must demon-
strate that she is in a protected class and is harmed by the stat-
ute.1 31  The threat of future prosecution has been held
sufficient to fulfill the requirement of harm.132 Second, the
state must prove a valid governmental interest in the legisla-
tion. In sodomy cases, for example, states contend that their
police power to regulate "sexual promiscuity or misconduct"
includes the regulation of sodomy.133 And finally, if the court
determines that the statute unnecessarily includes the chal-
lenger's behavior, it invalidates the statute.
Courts have used the overbreadth doctrine to challenge
the unconstitutionality of sodomy laws. Sodomy laws which
criminalize sodomy between husband and wife invade marital
privacy.134 The right to marital privacy (sexuality) is a long rec-
ognized, respected, and constitutionally protected "freedom."135
128. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
129. 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
130. Id. at 307.
131. Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 501, 287 A.2d 299, 302 (Md. 1972);
Swikert v. Cady, 381 F. Supp. 988 (1974), afd mem., 513 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1975);
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729, 731 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub non,
Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
132. Buchanan, 308 F. Supp. at 731.
133. Id. at 733.
134. Id. at 729, 735.
135. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. This line of reasoning is illustrated in
Buchanan where the court held the applicable sodomy statute "void on its face
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For unmarried heterosexuals overbreadth would seem to
be an ideal challenge to Minnesota's sodomy statute. The gen-
eral language in section 609.293 prohibits consensual sodomy
between married persons. However, overbreadth may not be
an attractive argument for lesbian or gay challengers of the
statute. Since lesbians and gays cannot legally marry, they will
have diffculty convincing a court that they are harmed by a
sodomy statute's invasion of the constitutional right to marital
privacy.136
To overcome this problem a court might require the les-
bian or gay to join married complainants, upon whose rights
any invalidation of the statute will be based.137 This require-
ment, in effect, permits the court and the legislature to con-
tinue state regulation of homosexual and other non-marital
sodomy. Such a practice reduces the chances of future judicial
invalidation of the statute by lending authority to negative judi-
cial comments concerning lesbians, gays, and unmarried heter-
osexuals who engage in sodomy. In rejecting the overbreadth
challenge, some courts have even indicated that they consider
punishing marital sodomy to prevent "sexual misconduct."' 38
E. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The eighth amendment prohibits cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. The Supreme Court has recognized two methods for
defining what conduct constitutes impermissibly cruel and un-
usual punishment. Punishment which is highly disproportion-
ate to the crime is unconstitutional. Punishment imposed on
someone because of a disease or that person's status is also un-
for unconstitutional overbreadth insofar as it reaches the private, consensual
acts of married couples." 308 F. Supp. at 735.
136. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. See Carter v. State, 255 Ark.
225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972);
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970). Standing is not
lightly granted, especially in cases concerning non-consensual sodomy. See
Swikert, 381 F. Supp. 988. If the challenger can prove that her individual pri-
vacy rights have been violated, the overbreadth doctrine may apply.
137. Buchanan, 308 F. Supp. at 730-31.
138. See, e.g., Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971) in which a
district court refused to exercise its equity jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of
a Texas sodomy law against married heterosexual couples. The court noted
that "[sodomy] is an act ... of immemorial anathema .... It is clearly an of-
fense involving moral turpitude whether defined by common law or by statute.
The practice is inherently inimical to the general integrity of the human per-
son." Id. at 1322. Even if the results of such cases are unfavorable to oppo-
nents of the sodomy laws they are consistent. It is hard to fault the logic in the
premise that if sodomy were immoral, it would be no less so between married
persons than between unmarried persons.
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constitutional. Challenges based on the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment doctrine have not fared well in constitutional
adjudication. The Supreme Court summarily dismissed the ar-
gument, for example, in Doe.139
The concept of impermissible disproportionality between
punishment and crime originated with Weems v. United
States.140 There, the Supreme Court held that "[in interpret-
ing the eighth amendment it will be regarded as a precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and pro-
portioned to the offense."141 The Court also articulated a way
to judge proportionality. It stated that "[in determining
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual ... this court will
consider the punishment of the same or similar crimes in other
parts of the United States... ."142 Punishment in Weems
seemed to mean length of imprisonment. Cases following
Weems, however, tended to focus on maltreatment of prisoners.
More recent cases have restricted Weems to its facts and have
indicated that mere length as opposed to the conditions of im-
prisonment are not determinative of unconstitutionality. 43
The argument that section 609.293 imposes disproportion-
ate punishment has been weakened by the leveling of
sentences bringing sodomy roughly into line with other sex of-
fenses in Minnesota.14 For over seventy-five years the maxi-
mum penalty for consensual sodomy was twenty years in
139. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901, reh'g denied,
425 U.S. 985 (1976).
140. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 350.
143. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271-76 (1980). See Atiyeh v. Capps, 449
U.S. 1312, 1316 (1981). But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
144. See supra note 127 for a history of the Minnesota legislature's amend-
ments of the sodomy statute. The original punishment for sodomy in Minne-
sota was a prison term of one to five years. Minn. Rev. Stat. ch. 107 § 13 (1851).
In 1891 the legislature increased the punishment to five to 20 years in state
prison. This harsh punishment remained a part of the sodomy statute until
1967 when the legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 609.293, which recognized four
degrees of sodomy. "Aggravated sodomy" was characterized by force or threats
and punished by up to 30 years in prison. "Sodomy" involving the misleading
or drugging of one person by another person was punishable by up to 20 years
in prison. Sodomy with a child was punishable by up to 30, 20, or 10 years, de-
pending upon the age of the child. Consensual sodomy ("voluntarily en-
gag[ing] in or submit[ing] to" acts of sodomy) was punished by up to one year
in the county work house, a $1,000 fine, or both. In 1977, the legislature incorpo-
rated aggravated sodomy, nonconsensual sodomy, and sodomy with a child into
other criminal sexual misconduct statutes. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342-.345
(criminal sexual conduct in the first, second, third, and fourth degree). Only
the prohibition of consensual sodomy and its one year/$41,000 penalty remain
intact. See Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1982).
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prison, but in 1967 the legislature reduced it to one year and a
$1,000 fine.l45
A disproportionate punishment argument also suffers
from the enormous latitude allowed judges in defining "similar"
crimes. To use other sex crimes to determine if sodomy is
"properly" punished, the court must first determine what other
sex crimes are similar to sodomy. The judicial discretion inher-
ent in this process makes the argument of disproportionality a
risky one. A judge may use rape or other forms of sexual
abuse as a standard in comparison to sodomy. The maximum
sentence under section 609.293, however, would fall well below
those of such "peers," and make a disproportionality argument
completely untenable.146 The final shortcoming of the dispro-
portionality argument is that a successful challenge is likely to
result only in a legislative reduction in penalty rather than
decriminalization.
Punishment based on status or disease was declared un-
constitutional in Robinson v. California.147 In Robinson the
Supreme Court invalidated a state law making addiction to nar-
cotics a crime. The Court compared addiction to various kinds
of disease, noting that the defendant need not have performed
any acts within the state to have committed the offense. The
Court reasoned that the imposition of any punishment for mere
status or disease, as opposed to acts, would universally be con-
sidered cruel and unusual.
A challenge based on the argument that section 609.293
makes homosexual status, as an assumed proclivity to engage
in certain acts, illegal would seem well-suited to lesbian or gay
challengers of Minnesota's sodomy statutes. The statute's fa-
cial proscription of isolated acts rather than lesbian or gay sta-
tus per se148, however, may undermine the argument that a
major effect of the statute is to make homosexual orientation it-
self illegal or at least suspect.
To say sodomy statutes inflict cruel and unusual punish-
145. Id.
146. In Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), the Arkansas court
rejected gay challengers' argument that an extremely disparate penalty for gay
offenders as opposed to married heterosexual offenders made the sodomy stat-
ute unconstitutional.
147. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
148. Stewart v. United States, 364 A.2d 1205, 1207-08 (D.C. 1976), held that the
District of Columbia sodomy statute "by its very terms, proscribes specific con-
duct and does not single out any particular group of persons." The court rea-
soned that discriminatory enforcement was due only to the police's lack of
knowledge of incidents of heterosexual sodomy. Id. at 1208.
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ment, when the statutes are not literally directed at homosexu-
als, lesbian and gay challengers would have to establish
discriminatory enforcement of the laws against them. The em-
pirical data necessary to sustain a claim of discriminatory en-
forcement based on homosexual status remains to be collected.
This limited study of Minnesota case law suggests that section
609.293 and previous sodomy laws have been used mainly to
prosecute non-consensual heterosexual sodomy or pederasty.
However, when consensual sodomy is censured under the law
it is virtually always between gay men.
The major impact of section 609.293 on lesbian and gay
Minnesotans may well be extra-legal in character and therefore
impossible to remedy under the eighth amendment. Many les-
bians and gay men feel that Minnesota law imposes upon them
a markedly "sub-legal" social status. The threat of prosecution
and the many harmful consequences of a perceived inferior so-
cial status are perhaps the real and most pervasive "punish-
ment" imposed by section 609.293.149
F. Establishment of Religion
Some legal scholars contend that the best challenge to
sodomy statutes derives fron the establishment of religion
clause of the first amendment.1 5 0 That clause, in effect, prohib-
its the intermingling of state and religion. Even though some of
the statutes derive from biblical passages, 15 1 the courts have ig-
nored establishment of religion challenges. 15 2 Perhaps these
challenges have been neglected because the pervasiveness of
anti-lesbian and anti-gay feeling obscures homophobia's reli-
gious origins and the religious impetus that often sustains it.
The Supreme Court's test for violation of the establish-
ment of religion clause is potentially difficult for any challenger
to meet. "[A] legislative enactment does not contravene the
Establishment Clause if it has a secular legislative purpose, if
its principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits
religion, and if it does not foster an excessive governmental en-
149. See supra note 28.
150. Katz, supra note 127, at 353-62.
151. See supra note 127. Compare the early Minnesota statutes cited in note
127 with Romans 1:26-27 which reads, "God gave them up unto vile affections:
for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against na-
ture; And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned
in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is un-
seemly.. ." Romans 1:26-27 (King James). See also Genesis 13:13, 18:20; Leviti-
cus 18:22.
152. Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973).
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tanglement with religion."153 Successful establishment of reli-
gion challenges depend upon the exclusively religious nature of
the challenged legislation. In Harris v. McRae'54 the Court
noted that "it does not follow that a statute violates the Estab-
lishment Clause because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some or all religions.' "155
Many proponents of section 609.293 defend the law on reli-
gious grounds including the religious leaders who testified at
Judge Winton's disciplinary hearing. Section 609.293 clearly co-
incides with the tenets of many religions, notably those of the
Christian and Jewish faiths. Many people see the statute as a
moral example and guideline, even if states do not rigidly en-
force them. These arguments might persuade a court that sec-
tion 609.293 has a "principal or primary effect" of advancing
religion.
A long history of state and private discrimination against
lesbians and gays provides ample "secular" support for sodomy
laws. Whether condemnation of homosexuality is seen as "reli-
gious" or "secular" depends a great deal upon the personal
view of the judge who must make the determination. For these
reasons, establishment of religion challenges are likely to fail
until societal prejudice against lesbians and gays abates.
G. Freedom of Expression
Challengers of state sodomy law have not often utilized
the first amendment "freedom of speech" clause. When such a
challenge has been made, courts have often rejected it. The
right to freedom of expression, presumably penumbral to the
first amendment, protects not only words but also some acts in-
tended as expressions of ideas. The Court's difficulty with the
acts/words distinction in first amendment case law15 6 bears out
the fact that when "words" are characterized as the antithesis
of "acts", neither is clearly definable. The distinction therefore,
153. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 653 (1980).
154. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
155. Ld. at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). In
Harris, the Court held that the Hyde amendment (which severely limited fed-
eral funding for abortions) did not violate the clause. The Court concluded that
the Hyde amendment was not an impermissible establishment of religion be-
cause disapproval of abortion is as much a "traditionalist" view as a religious
one. This was true despite the religious origins of many of our country's
traditions.
156. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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does not facilitate the formulation of legal rules for the applica-
tion of the first amendment. In a sense, all acts are expressions
of ideas.
As a general rule, "[c] ommunicative conduct is subject to
regulation as to 'time, place, and manner' in the furtherance of
a substantial governmental interest, so long as the restrictions
imposed are only so broad as required in order to further the
interest and are unrelated to the content and subject matter of
the message communicated."s5 7 In practice, protection of ex-
pressive acts, verbal or non-verbal, depends upon a judicial de-
termination that the acts are 1) meant to convey ideas, and
2) are not harmful, or 3) that any harm they may cause is out-
weighed by the social value of the free exchange of ideas."
Consensual sodomy as an expressive act meriting consti-
tutional protection was an issue raised by the plaintiffs in
Doe.15 9 The lower court in Doe did not discuss the argument in
its brief opinion. Such an argument is viable, however, when
combined with equal protection law. Expressions of heterosex-
uality are accepted and even encouraged by society, while ex-
pressions of homosexuality are censured. The state violates
the equal protection clause when it participates in this kind of
discrimination.
The first amendment equal protection right ... to lesbian/
gay public expression argues that official indulgence of one
[heterosexual expression] and sanctioning of the other [ho-
mosexual expression] is discrimination.... Once the ex-
pression of lesbian/gay personhood is seen as speech, the
alternative to protecting it is seen to chill expression, stifle
advocacy, and dictate 'affirmation of a belief in the content
of heterosexuality. 6 0
A similar argument based on private expression of lesbian
and gay status is even more persuasive. State interest in pub-
lic health or morals cannot justify intrusion into the private
sphere to prohibit private consensual sodomy. Therefore, sod-
157. Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 660 (1974) (quoting
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)).
158. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
159. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901, reh'g denied,
425 U.S. 985 (1976).
160. Jose Gomez, The Public Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Pro-
tected Speech, I Law & Inequality 121, 128 (1983). Gomez asserts that there is
no speech exception (such as obscenity or libel) applicable to such expression
nor is there an outweighing state interest in regulation.
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omy laws broadly infringe on the constitutional right to free-
dom of private expression.
Freedom of expression challenges to sodomy statutes
based on the first amendment are heavily subject to judicial
prejudices. Legal rules give the court of jurisdiction a great
deal of leeway in evaluating both the harm caused by sodomy
and the value of the participant's "expression." When judges
weigh these harms and values a freedom of expression ruling is
especially subject to political influences and changing social at-
titudes. Minnesota courts might reject the freedom of expres-
sion argument after their subjective determinations that the
idea or ideas expressed in the act of private consensual sodomy
are of minimal value and are clearly outweighed by the harm it
is assumed to cause. Once again the requisite quantum of spe-
cific proof of causality may vary according to the court's assess-
ment of the constitutional right in question. A favorable
reevaluation of gay men as well as a determination that homo-
sexual sodomy is not harmful may be evidenced by Minne-
sota's failure to prosecute Winton under section 609.293. Such
political and judicial influences would support invalidation of
section 609.293 under the first amendment.
IV. Conclusion
Section 609.293 and its use by Minnesota law enforcement
agencies serve the institution of forced heterosexuality in three
major ways. First, section 609.293 is used chiefly to police sex-
ual behavior that falls outside the bounds of institutionalized
heterosexuality. On the one hand, convictions for heterosexual
conduct tend to involve sodomy in the context of brutal rapes
and child abuse. The law stops acceptable male aggression
only when it begins to threaten male access to other men's wo-
men and children. On the other hand, both consensual and
non-consensual sexual contact between adult male peers
seems to be subject to censure under section 609.293, but often
male power and prerogative, both social and sexual, allow the
participants to keep the contact hidden and ultimately to avoid
actual conviction. Thus the law codifies the social belief that
male sexual aggression is generally acceptable when it is per-
petrated against women and children, but unacceptable when
directed toward men. Second, the statute imposes semi-crimi-
nal status upon lesbians and gays. This status lessens the
threat their sexual orientation poses to institutionalized hetero-
sexuality. The social consequence of section 609.293 is the
1984]
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delegitimization of lesbians and gays because they deviate
from set gender roles. In effect, the statute punishes gay men
for initiating sexual aggression toward other males. It punishes
lesbians for refusing to be objects of male sexual aggression.
Third, regardless of its actual enforcement, section 609.293 codi-
fies and serves as an official condonation of religious and semi-
religious beliefs that support institutionalized heterosexuality
and homophobia.
The major constitutional challenge to the statute-that of
substantive due process and the right to privacy-would, if suc-
cessful, have the effect of adding more governmental sanction
to male dominance and the social institutions that perpetuate
it. Litigators must modify governmental policy of noninterven-
tion so that the policy recognizes the problem of social inequal-
ity. This modification would render the privacy argument for
invalidation of section 609.293 ethically sound.
Because the cruel and unusual punishment challenge, the
establishment of religion challenge, and the freedom of expres-
sion challenge do not extend the privacy doctrine to sexual ac-
tivity per se, these challenges are the best means of attacking
the constitutionality of Minnesota sodomy law. Since the law
in these areas allows for considerable judicial discretion, a
political climate and a general judicial attitude favoring equal-
ity for lesbians and gays may be necessary for the invalidation
of section 609.293 on these grounds. As lesbians and, more real-
istically, gay men gain financial, professional, and social status
in Minnesota, such a ruling will become more possible.
Judge Winton's harsh treatment by the Board of Judicial
Responsibility shows that the judicial reevaluation of homosex-
ual status necessary for a successful first amendment or cruel
and unusual punishment challenge is not immediately forth-
coming. At this point, lesbians and gays are perceived as
threatening the status quo of male power. Therefore the infer-
ior status that section 609.293 imposes upon them remains an
incident of institutionalized male power.
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